



DECLASSIFIED EXCISE
Department of State
TELEGRAM

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AM: DB30349-0369

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 AID-07 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00
EA-10 DODE-00 H-01 IO-11 NEA-06 NSC-01 NSAE-00
HA-08 L-03 PH-08 PA-01 SVC-00 SMS-01 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRG-01 /110 W DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/ABR
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P 201432Z JUN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1983
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

REVIEWED by _____ DATE 2/14/90
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () Non-responsive info
FOI, EO or PA exemptions _____
TS authority to: _____
() CLASSIFY to _____, OADB
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADB

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 07783

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL AF UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET EXPERT FORESEES LONG SOVIET COMMITMENT
IN AFGHANISTAN

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. *1*

DESCRIBED A GLOOMY
OUTLOOK FOR THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN IN AN
INFORMAL DISCUSSION.

END SUMMARY.

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3. []RESSED SOVIET INTEREST IN GETTING OUT OF AFGHANISTAN IN A CONVERSATION WITH AN EMBASSY OFFICER. HIS CURRENT MOOD IS FAR FROM SANGUINE THAT EVENTS WILL MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION. INSTEAD, HE SKETCHED A PICTURE OF AFGHANISTAN BEING BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL OVER A LONG PERIOD IN MUCH THE SAME FASHION AS TADZHIKISTAN IN THE TWENTIES. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE TADZHIK BORDER HAD NOT BEEN FIRMLY SECURED UNTIL 1933, BUT SOVIET AUTHORITIES THROUGH MASSIVE USE OF FORCE HAD BEEN ABLE TO RETAIN THE TERRITORY DESPITE A LARGE REFUGEE FLOW INTO NEIGHBORING TERRITORY AND SUBSEQUENT GUERRILLA RESISTANCE.

4. ANALYZING THE POSITIONS OF THE MAJOR ACTORS. [] SAID PRESIDENT ZIA HAD EVERY REASON TO WANT THE WAR TO CONTINUE. ESCHEWING THE FAMILIAR SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT PAKISTAN FOUND THE WAR A CONVENIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. ARMS AID, [] THE PRIMARY BENEFIT FOR ZIA WAS THE FACT THAT TURBULENCE ON PAKISTAN'S BORDERS STRENGTHENED THE CASE FOR FIRM LEADERSHIP. NO OTHER LEADER WAS ON THE HORIZON TO CHALLENGE ZIA.

5. [] AGREED WITH PALMER'S OBSERVATION THAT MRS. GANDHI DID NOT FAVOR CONTINUATION OF THE WAR, SINCE IT BROUGHT THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN TOGETHER. HE CONCURRED IN THE THESIS THAT INDIA DID NOT WANT EITHER SUPERPOWER TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN THE REGION. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HE DISAGREED WITH THE PROPOSITION THAT INDIA HAD ANY INTEREST IN PARTITIONING PAKISTAN BETWEEN ITSELF AND A SOVIET-DOMINATED AFGHANISTAN.

6. AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION, [] SAID THAT WHEREAS
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A FINLAND-LIKE STATUS WOULD ONCE HAVE SATISFIED MOSCOM. THE BEST AFGHANISTAN COULD EXPECT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WAS A MONGOLIAN SOLUTION. HE FIRMLY DENIED ANY SOVIET DESIRE TO GAIN ACCESS TO WARM WATER BUT SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD STAY A LONG TIME IF NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE REGIME THAT CAME TO POWER IN THE 1978 REVOLUTION.

7. [] AFGHANISTAN WAS NOT VIETNAM. THERE WERE NO EVENING TELEVISION NEWS PICTURES OF BATTLES SHOWN IN THE SOVIET UNION. NO OUTCRY FROM THE SOVIET

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PUBLIC COULD BE EXPECTED. PUT SOVIET TROOP STRENGTH AT ABOUT 85,000. HE SUGGESTED THAT HIGHER ESTIMATES IN THE WEST MIGHT BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY MEDICAL UNITS NOT COUNTED IN SOVIET CALCULATIONS. HE CLAIMED THE AFGHAN ARMY WAS WELL ALONG IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING UP TO A STRENGTH OF 100,000 AS IT HAD BEEN BEFORE 1978. HE SAID THE USSR HAD NO INTEREST IN ESCALATING ITS OWN MILITARY STRENGTH, BUT HE FEARED THAT CONTINUED FIGHTING WOULD HAVE A DAMAGING POLITICAL EFFECT BY UNDERMINING THE "LIBERAL" ELEMENTS IN THE DRA, A GROUP THAT INCLUDED KARMAL AND DOST. HE LAMENTED THAT PAKISTAN SEEMED TO BE MISSING AN OPPORTUNITY THAT WOULD NOT SOON BE REPEATED TO GAIN A SECURE, RECOGNIZED BORDER (DURAND LINE) AND TO DEAL WITH AN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT THAT WAS PURSUING REASONABLE POLICIES.

8. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, SOVIET ALLEGATIONS THAT THE SITUATION WOULD RIGHT ITSELF IF EXTERNAL RESIST SAID SOVIET TROOPS COULD PROBABLY SEE THEY DEPLOYED RIGHT NEXT TO PAKISTANI MOSCOW REALIZED THAT THIS WOULD BE SEEN A NEVERTHELESS.

NOTE BY OC/T: LINES OF PARA 8 APPEAR FORESHORTENED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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USIE-00 SP-02 EKP-01 PRS-01 /110 W
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P 201432Z JUN 83

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7984
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 07783

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL AF UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET EXPERT FORESEES LONG SOVIET COMMITMENT

STOP INFILTRATION. WITH OUTSIDE HELP CUT OFF
COULD PACIFY THE COUNTRY BY STRIKING BARGAINS W
EIGHTY TRIBAL ELDERS WHO CONTROLLED VARIOUS P
COUNTRY. HIS PARTING THOUGHT WAS THAT THE
AFGHANISTAN SHOULD NOT BE JUDGED BY WESTERN S
NEITHER THE AFGHANS NOR THE SOVIETS WOULD HELI
USE FORCE ON A GREAT SCALE IF NECESSARY TO SAVE
SITUATION.

9. COMMENT: IMPLICIT  VIEWS IS AN
ASSUMPTION THAT THE UN-SPONSORED TALKS ARE NOT LIKELY
TO BEAR FRUIT AND THAT THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN
WILL CONTINUE FOR A LONG TIME. WHEN PRESSED, OR EXAMPLE
ON HIS VIEW THAT A KARNAL GOVERNMENT COULD SOM HOW
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GOVERN IF OUTSIDE GUERRILLA ATTACKS CEASED. HE STUCK TO
HIS ANALYSIS BUT DID NOT POLEMICIZE. HE DID NOT DISPUTE

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THE FACT THAT KARMAL HAD THREE STRIKES AGAINST HIM BECAUSE OF THE WAY HE CAME TO POWER, ALTHOUGH HE NOTED THAT DAQUD, TARAHI AND AMIN WERE EQUALLY LACKING IN LEGITIMACY. THE OVERWHELMING IMPRESSION LEFT AFTER THIS CORDIAL AND LARGELY DISPASSIONATE CONVERSATION WAS ONE OF A SCHOLAR ADAPTING TO NEW REALITIES WITHOUT MUCH EXPECTATION OF A CHANGED SITUATION.

10. FOR KABUL: MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
HARTMAN

NOTE BY OC/T: LINES OF FIRST PARA (LAST OF NUMBERED PARA 8)
APPEAR FORESHORTENED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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